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Note
An Analysis of In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum (United States v. Doe): Does
the Fifth Amendment Protect the Contents
of Private Papers?
"The privilege against self-incrimination is a right that was hard-
earned by our forefathers. The reasons for its inclusion in the
Constitution-and the necessities for its preservation-are to be
found in the lessons of history."
Chief Justice Earl Warren1
I. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has
been interpreted repeatedly by the Supreme Court of the
United States. In the past, the Court had held that in order to
protect this constitutional right, the Fifth Amendment must be
construed broadly. 2 However, down through the years, the
Supreme Court has limited this protection by excluding certain
types of documents from its reach. 3 Most recently, the Court
declined to address the issue in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Du-
ces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992 (United States v. Doe)4 ("In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum").
In 1976, the Supreme Court changed its analytical ap-
proach to the Fifth Amendment privilege from one that histori-
1. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).
2. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). For a
further discussion of these cases see infra part II.C.




cally protected the contents of a person's business or private
papers to one that excludes the contents of such papers from its
protection unless otherwise privileged under a compelled pro-
duction theory.5 Despite this theoretical alteration, the Court
has never expressly overruled nor indicated its intent to over-
rule the seminal case, Boyd v. United States,6 which held that
the contents of one's private papers were absolutely protected
by the Fifth Amendment.7 Thus, the Supreme Court's analyti-
cal shift has created confusion in the lower courts and disagree-
ment amongst the federal circuit courts of appeal.
In an effort to highlight the split in the federal circuit
courts of appeals, this Note will discuss the recent decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum.6 The court in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum undermined the Boyd holding and
held that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
did not extend to the contents of voluntarily prepared private
papers. 9
Part II of this Note highlights the origin, intent and signifi-
cance of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.'0 Additionally, it sets forth the original role of the Fifth
Amendment in its protection of personal and non-personal doc-
uments and the modern trend narrowing this protection. Fi-
nally, Part II identifies the theoretical shift in the Supreme
Court's reasoning from a content-based standard enunciated in
Boyd to a compelled production theory explicated in Fisher v.
5. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405-13. This theory provides that, as long as a docu-
ment is created voluntarily, its required disclosure does not offend the Fifth
Amendment unless the very act of producing would involve a testimonial incrimi-
nation, such as authenticating the document. Id. at 410-13. See also United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). For further discussion of testimonial incrimi-
nation and the "act of production" theory, see Charles Gardner Geyd, The Testimo-
nial Component of the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 611
(1987). See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7. Id. at 630.
8. 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).
9. Id. at 93. The court concluded that the Fifth Amendment "act of produc-
tion" privilege did not protect voluntarily prepared private papers which had been
produced and authenticated in a prior administrative proceeding. Id. at 93-94.
10. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT (1968)
(explaining the history of the Fifth Amendment).
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United States." Part II will discuss selected decisions from var-
ious federal circuit courts of appeals to exemplify how the
Supreme Court's analytical shift has generated confusion and
disharmony amongst the circuit courts. 12
Part III discusses the reasoning of the majority and dis-
senting opinions in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecurn.13
Part IV examines the erosion of the Fifth Amendment's protec-
tion of private papers.14 It also suggests that the Second Circuit
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum erred by not follow-
ing established Supreme Court precedent. 15 Finally, Part IV
suggests that the reasoning of certain circuit courts provides an
appropriate balance between the competing interests of disclo-
sure versus protection of purely private documents. 16
This Note concludes that the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit should have more broadly construed the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Such a broad con-
struction would have honored Supreme Court precedent and
would have retained a distinctive protection of private papers
consistent with the purpose of the Fifth Amendment. 17
II. Background
A. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
11. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
12. See United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Grand
Jury Investigation (Heller), 921 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir. 1991); In re Steinberg, 837
F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1988); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
473 U.S. 925 (1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033 (3d
Cir. 1980).
13. 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994). See infra notes
186-218 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
15. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. See, e.g., In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1988); Butcher v. Bailey,
753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
17. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414-15 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
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case to be a witness against himself."18 The privilege against
self-incrimination came to the United States as part of the Eng-
lish common law system of criminal justice.19 By the mid-
1700s, the American colonies generally accepted the privilege as
a settled legal concept. 20 It then became a right under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution when the privi-
lege was drafted into the Bill of Rights. 21 In 1964, it was made
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 22
A central purpose of the constitutional privilege was to pre-
vent the criminal justice system from forcefully extracting evi-
dence from an accused in the form of documents or oral
testimony, which could then be used against him or her to ob-
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. See LEVY, supra note 10; see also Kathleen Maloney, Abolition of Fifth
Amendment Protection For The Contents of Preexisting Documents: United States
v. Doe, 38 Sw. L.J. 1023 (1984).
The privilege against self-incrimination began in England in the twelfth cen-
tury during the struggle against the inquisitorial procedures of the ecclesiastical
courts. LEVY, supra note 10, at 43-51; Maloney, supra, at 1024-25. The ecclesiasti-
cal courts were religious tribunals that had jurisdiction over a large number of
crimes that would today be considered secular crimes. LEVY, supra note 10, at 43-
44. The English ecclesiastical courts administered an ex officio oath to the accused
without 1) charging him or her formally, 2) identifying the accusers, or 3) revealing
the evidence against the accused. Id. at 46-47. The oath was administered by a
judge to an accused who was then compelled to testify regarding the facts of the
charges brought against him. Id. at 46-49. After the judge administered the oath,
the accused was required to respond to questions that were intended to elicit a
confession. Id. The oath was ultimately abolished in 1641 "and the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was established ... in the ecclesiastical courts" in
order to prevent a recurrence of the inquisitorial procedures. Id. at 281-82.
Since the religious courts were separate from the common law criminal courts
and the early English common law criminal courts did not use inquisitorial meth-
ods, the right against compulsory self-incrimination did not extend to common law
criminal procedure until many years later. Id. at 330-32. Slowly, English society
recognized that the right was necessary to assure a fair procedure to one accused of
crimes and, therefore, it became part of the English law and known as "one of the
great landmarks of man's struggle to make himself civilized." Id. at 332 (quoting
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FiFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955)).
20. LEvY, supra note 10, at 368-404.
21. Maloney, supra note 19, at 1024. Maloney indicates that the title "privi-
lege against self-incrimination" is actually a misnomer because, despite its English
origin, it "was made a constitutional right in this country as part of the Fifth
Amendment, which was ratified in 1791." Id. at 1031 n.10. This Note agrees with
Maloney, but uses the terms interchangeably.
22. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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tain a conviction. 23 The motivating force behind the privilege
was an "inten[tion] to shield the guilty and imprudent as well
as the innocent and foresighted." 24 Other policies and purposes
underlying the Fifth Amendment included a "preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice";25 and a profound respect for each person's right "'to a pri-
vate enclave where he may lead a private life.'"26
The basic test for the applicability of the Fifth Amendment
privilege has been "whether the claimant is confronted by sub-
stantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards
of incrimination."27 In addition, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the right against self-incrimination as "essentially a per-
sonal one,"2 applying only to the individual asserting it and
"not to [the] information that may incriminate him."29 Nor does
the right extend to all types of incriminating evidence "but ap-
plies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial
communication that is incriminating."30
In Schmerber v. California,3' the Court identified the deter-
minative factor as whether or not the individual is compelled
"to be a witness against himself."32 The Court concluded that
while the Fifth Amendment protects an "accused's communica-
23. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); see also Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958).
24. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51 (1968).
25. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
26. Id. (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir.
1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
27. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53 (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367,
374 (1951)). Marchetti noted that the risk of incrimination could extend to pro-
spective acts and held that compelling persons involved with gambling to register
for payment of an occupational tax would "significantly enhance the likelihood of
their prosecution for future acts, and... readily provide evidence which [would]
facilitate their convictions." Id. at 52-54.
In addition, despite the precise language-"shall be compelled in any criminal
case"-the Fifth Amendment privilege has been held to apply in other legal situa-
tions. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (congressional investigations); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (civil proceedings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892) (grand jury proceedings).
28. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944).
29. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
30. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408.
31. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
32. Id. at 761.
5
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tions, whatever form they may take,"3 it does not protect non-
communicative evidence.m Thus, the Court did not extend the
privilege to the results of a blood sample analysis.35 The Court
reasoned that, although evidence from the blood test was an "in-
criminating product of compulsion, [it] was neither petitioner's
testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or
writing by [him]." 36
Similarly, in Gilbert v. California7 the Supreme Court re-
fused to apply the privilege to handwriting exemplars taken of
the petitioner.38 Although the Court noted the communicative
aspects of handwriting, it held that the handwriting exemplar
was merely a physical characteristic and, therefore, was outside
the scope of Fifth Amendment protection.39
In sum, the Fifth Amendment historically has provided
protection for verbal and written' communications that are in-
criminating and testimonial. 40 The Supreme Court enunciated
its first standard of Fifth Amendment protection in Boyd v.
United States.41 The Boyd standard provided broad Fifth
Amendment protection for the contents of personal papers.42 In
subsequent decisions, however, the Supreme Court limited the
33. Id. at 763-64.
34. Id. at 761.
35. Id. at 765.
36. Id. The Court noted that lower federal and state courts had held that the
Fifth Amendment did not protect an individual from compulsory submission to
"fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identifica-
tion, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particu-
lar gesture." Id. at 764.
For a general discussion of the testimonial aspects of the Fifth Amendment,
see Geyd, supra note 5.
37. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
38. Id. at 266.
39. Id. at 266-67. The Gilbert Court acknowledged that "voice and handwrit-
ing are, of course, means of communication," but emphasized that an exemplar is
simply an identifying characteristic. Id. at 266. In other words, the content of the
exemplar in Gilbert was not a "communicative matter" within the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 266-67.
40. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See also Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (holding that the accused's testimony would not
have to support a conviction on its own but need only "furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute").
41. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
42. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
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Fifth Amendment protection of certain types of documents. 43
The Court ultimately changed its standard from one that pro-
tected the contents of personal papers to one that protected only
the act of producing such documents. 44
B. The Content-Based Standard for the Protection of Papers
Under the Fifth Amendment
The first Supreme Court case to examine the extent of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against the compelled production of
an individual's documents was Boyd v. United States.45 In
Boyd, a civil forfeiture action was brought against a partnership
for importing thirty-five cases of plate glass without paying the
prescribed statutory duty.46 At trial, the prosecution sought to
establish the quantity and value of previously imported glass by
obtaining an invoice belonging to the partners.47 The prosecu-
tion relied upon a statute which required defendants to produce
"any business book, invoice, or paper belonging to, or under the
control of, the defendant"48 demanded by the prosecution as nec-
essary to prove particular allegations made in the government's
case.49 The trial court ordered the partners to comply with the
statute. 50 The partners produced the demanded invoice, but ar-
43. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612, 617 (1984) (holding that
although the Fifth Amendment privilege protected a sole proprietor from produc-
ing his business records, it did not protect their contents); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (holding that a taxpayer's lawyer could not invoke the
privilege to avoid producing the taxpayer's accountant's financial records, which
had been previously transferred to the lawyer); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85, 101 (1974) (holding that a partner in a small law firm could not invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid producing the partnership's financial records);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 705 (1944) (holding that neither a labor
union nor its agents or representatives could invoke the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to avoid producing the union's business records); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361,385-86 (1911) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not protect a presi-
dent of a corporation who refused to comply with a subpoena to produce his busi-
ness records because they contained personal information); see infra notes 68-79,
91-114, 127-34 and accompanying text.
44. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
45. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See Samuel A. Alito, Documents and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 29 (1986).
46. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18.
47. Id. at 618.
48. Id. at 619-20.
49. Id. at 620.
50. Id. at 618.
7
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:303
gued that its compulsion was unconstitutional under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. 51 The invoice was introduced into evi-
dence, the jury found the partners guilty of violating the statute
and the Court ordered forfeiture of the thirty-five cases of
glass.52
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the trial court's de-
cision.53 The Court rejected the prosecution's argument that
the statute was constitutional because it did not authorize a
search and seizure of the invoices but mere production of
them.5 4 The Court held that "any forcible and compulsory ex-
tortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods"
violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution. 55
The Court concluded that compelling Boyd to produce his
invoices or private papers was "compelling him to be a witness
against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution."5 6 The Boyd Court thus provided broad pro-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 638.
54. Id. at 621.
55. Id. at 630. In such cases, the Court continued, "the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other." Id.
Boyd's peculiar combination of Fourth and Fifth Amendment principles be-
came problematic in later cases because the protections of the amendments were
directed toward different types of governmental intrusion. See Alito, supra note
45, at 27, 35-38.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment prohibitions are based upon the rea-
sonableness of searches and seizures. Conversely, the Fifth Amendment "forbids
any force or compulsion for the purpose of extracting self incrimination" whether
reasonable or not. Alito, supra, note 45, at 35-36.
56. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35. The Boyd Court referred to Lord Camden's dis-
cussion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (K.B. 1765) (Cam-
den, C.J.), regarding the secrecy of one's private papers. The Boyd Court
emphasized that " '[plapers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his
dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear
an inspection.'" Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627-28 (quoting Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials
at 1066). The Howell's State Trials version of the Entick opinion differs in mate-
310
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tection for the contents of one's personal papers.57 The Court
noted that historically such compulsion contradicted the "prin-
ciples of a free government."58 Therefore, the Court declared
the forfeiture statute unconstitutional and ruled that the in-
voices could not be admitted into evidence.6 9
For nearly a century, Boyd was relied upon by the courts
for the proposition that private documents fell within a "zone of
privacy"60 and could not be subpoenaed without violating the
Fifth Amendment.6' Despite such reliance, however, Boyd's vi-
tality has been called into question by more recent Supreme
Court decisions. 62
rial respects from the official opinion. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB.
1765).
The Boyd Court relied upon Entick when it declared that it was the "invasion
of his indefeasible rights of personal security, personal liberty and private prop-
erty, [that] constitute[d] the essence of [the offense]" against Boyd and not the
mere search and seizure of his documents. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. Thus, Boyd
continued the historical protection against the intrusion into one's personal zone of
privacy as enunciated in Entick and established a broad constitutional protection
of private documents under the Fifth Amendment. Id. See also LEVY, supra note
10, at 393 (quoting Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1038, 1041, 1063, 1073).
57. It should be noted that the documents at issue in Boyd were business in-
voices, as opposed to more personal papers such as diaries, journals, etc. The
Court simply decided that all of the contents would be protected without character-
izing the contents as personal or nonpersonal. For this reason, commentators have
referred to the Boyd holding as a content-based or content-neutral standard. See,
e.g., Alito, supra note 45, at 31.
58. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-32.
59. Id. at 638.
60. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (stating
that "[t]he Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing that the Constitu-
tion guarantees certain zones of privacy and citing Boyd for its roots in the Fifth
Amendment). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) (stating that Boyd was "a case that will be remembered as long
as civil liberty lives in the United States" for recognizing a constitutional right to
personal privacy under the Fifth Amendment); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 775-76 (1966) (declaring Boyd as "among the greatest constitutional decisions
of this Court" because it construed liberally the Bill of Rights by recognizing a zone
of privacy under the Fifth Amendment).
61. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 375 (1911).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). For a
9
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C. Erosion of the Boyd Contents-Based Standard
The erosion of the broad Fifth Amendment protection enun-
ciated in Boyd began first in those cases involving corporate,
partnership, and labor union documents and, second, in per-
sonal documents in the possession of third persons. In 1906,
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of corporate documents
in Hale v. Henkel.63 In Henkel, the Court held that a corpora-
tion could not invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 64 The Court distinguished persons from corpora-
tions, noting that the former were guaranteed constitutional
rights but the latter were not.65 Reasoning that a corporation
was a "creature of the state,"66 which was granted special privi-
leges but limited statutory rights, the Court held that a corpora-
tion could not refuse to produce its books and records when
charged with abusing its privileges.67
Two years later, in Wilson v. United States,68 the Supreme
Court extended the Henkel rule to officers of a corporation. In
Wilson, the issue was whether a president of a corporation could
invoke the privilege when he was issued a subpoena by the fed-
eral court of appeals to produce corporate records and books to a
grand jury.69 Relying on Boyd, Wilson asserted his Fifth
Amendment right and refused to comply with the order, argu-
ing that the records were kept and used by him alone in his
office and contained personal information and other correspon-
dence relating to the business.70 However, the Court distin-
guished the compelled production of private books and papers
in Boyd from the documents subpoenaed in Wilson, that had
been described in the summons as "books of the corporation."
71
Although the Court acknowledged and even suggested that Wil-
son could remove his private papers from the books to avoid
general discussion of the erosion of the Fifth Amendment protections after Boyd,
see Maloney, supra note 19.
63. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
64. Id. at 75-76.
65. Id. at 74-75.
66. Id. at 74.
67. Id. at 74-75.
68. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
69. Id. at 367.
70. Id. at 363, 368-69.
71. Id. at 377-78.
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scrutiny, the Court held that the corporate records and other
related documents did not fall within the ambit of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. 72 Therefore, the Supreme Court held
that the constitutional right against self-incrimination did not
extend to the official custodian of corporate records whose per-
sonal documents were not at issue.73
In 1944, the Supreme Court expounded on its reasoning in
Henkel and Wilson by addressing the issue of labor union docu-
ments in United States v. White.74 In White, the Court noted
that the historic purpose of the privilege was to protect individ-
uals, rather than corporate entities from compulsory incrimina-
tion by the government. 75 It then determined that labor unions
were structurally and functionally more like corporations than
individuals.76 Reasoning that the government had the power to
make reasonable demands on corporations to enforce federal
and state regulations and law,77 the Court determined that it
had a similar power to make reasonable regulatory demands for
documents relating to union activities. 78 The Court thus con-
72. Id. at 378. "[Tlhe mere fact that [Wilson] himself wrote, or signed, the
official letters copied into the books, neither conditioned nor enlarged 'his privi-
lege." Id. The test was whether the nature or content of the documents was pri-
vate or corporate. Id. at 378-79. Under the Fifth Amendment, corporate
documents in the possession of an individual were not protected even if the papers
would incriminate the individual. Id. On the other hand, the Court noted that the
Fifth Amendment would protect an individual from the compelled production of
incriminating private documents in his possession, even if they were authored by
another person. Id. at 378.
Noting that the Boyd Court emphasized that it was the nature of the private
papers themselves that justified the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Wilson Court
stated that "in the case of public records and official documents, made or kept in
the administration of public office," neither possession nor custody would permit
the officer to claim Fifth Amendment protection in order to resist inspection. Id. at
380. Noting that the corporation was not a public office, the Court stated that "the
principle applie[d] not only to public documents in public offices, but also to records
required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of trans-
actions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation." Id.
73. Id. at 386.
74. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
75. Id. at 698-99.
76. Id. at 701. The Court identified the test as whether the organization seek-
ing to invoke the privilege "ha[d] a character so impersonal in the scope of its mem-
bership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely
private or personal interest of its constituents, but rather to embody the common
or group interests only." Id.
77. Id. at 700-01.
78. Id. at 701.
11
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cluded that neither a labor union nor its officers or agents could
invoke the personal privilege of the Fifth Amendment to avoid
producing union records. 79
Thus, in Henkel and Wilson, respectively, the Supreme
Court established that the Fifth Amendment privilege would
not protect corporate records or the custodian of such docu-
ments. Following that line of reasoning, the Supreme Court in
White held that the privilege did not extend to labor unions.
Still undecided, however, was whether the privilege would ex-
tend to an individual's personal documents in the possession of
a third party. This issue was ultimately addressed in Couch v.
United States.80
In Couch, the sole proprietor of a restaurant invoked the
Fifth Amendment privilege to resist a subpoena to produce her
financial records.81 For more than fifteen years, the proprietor
had been disclosing financial information to her tax account-
ant. 2 Although she had relinquished possession of the business
records to her accountant, she retained ownership of all the fi-
nancial documents.8 3 In connection with an Internal Revenue
Service investigation of the proprietor's tax liabilities, the gov-
ernment issued a summons to her accountant requiring the ac-
countant to produce the proprietor's "books, records, papers, or
other data.., as may be relevant or material to such inquiry."8 4
On appeal,8 5 the Supreme Court stated that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was "an intimate and personal one" that
attached to the person seeking its protection rather than to the
information that might be incriminating.8 6 The Court empha-
sized that it was the proprietor's accountant who was compelled
by the subpoena to produce the financial records, and not the
proprietor herself. 87 The Court distinguished the proprietor
from a person that the privilege was intended to protect, stating
79. Id. at 704-05.
80. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
81. Id. at 324-25.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 325 n.5.
85. The lower courts determined that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not
extend to the proprietor. Id. at 324.
86. Id. at 327-28 (citing White, 322 U.S. at 698).
87. Id. at 329.
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that "the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused
[was] lacking."88 The Court concluded that the benchmark for
protection under the Fifth Amendment was "'not the ownership
of property but the "physical or moral compulsion" exerted.' "89
Therefore, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not
protect the documents because there was "no semblance of gov-
ernmental compulsion against the person of the accused."90
In 1974, one year after Couch, the Supreme Court in Bellis
v. United States9' reexamined the reasoning in Boyd, Wilson
and White to determine whether the compelled production of
partnership records of a small dissolved law firm violated the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 92 In Bellis, a
former partner of a three-partner law firm was issued a sub-
poena requiring him to produce the firm's financial records and
appear before a grand jury.93 The partner complied with the
appearance order but refused to produce the records, claiming
his Fifth Amendment privilege.94 Relying on Boyd, the partner
argued that the small firm was not a separate entity but the
embodiment of "the personal legal practice of the individual
partners."95
Writing for the Supreme Court majority, Justice Marshall
reaffirmed Boyd's holding "that the Fifth Amendment privilege
... protect[ed] an individual from compelled production of his
88. Id. Although the Court acknowledged that actual possession of the com-
pelled documents was the most significant factor in determining the relationship
between the Fifth Amendment privilege and compulsion of the accused's docu-
ments, the Court noted that there could be situations where "constructive posses-
sion is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and
insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially
intact." Id. at 333.
Constructive possession "exists where one does not have physical custody or
possession, but is in a position to exercise dominion or control over a thing."
BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990).
89. Couch, 409 U.S. at 333, 336 (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7,
15 (1918)).
90. Id. at 336. The Court also noted that there was "no legitimate expectation
of privacy." Id.
91. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
92. Id. at 86.
93. Id. In addition to the three partners in the firm, there were approximately
six employees: two additional of counsel attorneys, three secretaries, and one re-
ceptionist. Id.
94. Id.




personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testi-
mony."96 However, the Court then analogized the partnership's
subpoenaed documents to the corporate papers in Wilson and
the labor union records in White and reasoned that the partner-
ship similarly "represent[ed] organized institutional activity so
as to preclude any claim of Fifth Amendment privilege with re-
spect to the partnership's financial records." 97 Thus, despite the
small size of the partnership and the incriminating aspects of
the documents, the Court rejected the partner's claim of Fifth
Amendment protection. 98
D. The Analytical Shift to the Compelled Production
Standard
In 1976, just two years after Bellis, the Supreme Court de-
cided Fisher v. United States.99 In Fisher, the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether a taxpayer could invoke his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination when his attorney
was issued a subpoena to produce the taxpayer's tax documents
and the documents themselves had been prepared by the tax-
payer's accountant. 100 The Court stated that to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege, the individual asserting the right had to
be the one compelled to produce the documents in question. 1 1
Therefore, even if the privilege could protect the documents
while in the claimant's possession, the privilege could not be in-
96. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87. This statement reiterates the Boyd Court holding
that the Fifth Amendment privilege extended to the private business documents of
an individual. Id. at 87-88 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
97. Id. at 93. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). Accord
Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74
(1913); Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911).
98. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101. The Court noted that the result might have been
different if the small firm was a "small family partnership," thus giving some
credence to the petitioner's argument that the records were personal in nature. Id.
99. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
100. Id. at 393. In Fisher, Internal Revenue Service agents interviewed tax-
payers pursuant to an investigation into violations of federal income tax laws. Id.
at 393-94. The accountants for the taxpayers then prepared documents related to
the tax returns of the taxpayers. Id. at 394. The documents were given to the
taxpayers who then transferred them to the attorneys retained in connection with
the IRS investigation. Id. The IRS served summonses on the attorneys requiring
them to produce the documents. Id. When the attorneys refused to comply with
the summonses, the IRS commenced enforcement proceedings. Id. at 395.
101. Id. at 396-97.
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voked by the claimant's agent once these same documents had
been transferred to the agent.10 2 Thus, relying on the Couch
holding that the Fifth Amendment did not protect documents in
the possession of a third party, the Supreme Court rejected the
taxpayer's assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege. 103 The
Court held that enforcing the summonses against the attorneys
"would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything-and certainly
would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself."' 0 4
Additionally, the Court noted that the accountants had pre-
pared the tax documents rather than the taxpayers themselves,
and that they were prepared voluntarily without coercion. 0 5
Therefore, the Court held that the documents would not have
been protected even if they were in the hands of the taxpayers
because the documents did not constitute compelled testi-
mony. 06 The Court acknowledged that in some situations the
mere act of producing the subpoenaed documents might involve
some "communicative aspects," such as authenticating the doc-
uments or acknowledging their existence, independent of the
documents' contents. 07 However, the Court determined that
the accountants' preparation and control of the documents pre-
cluded a finding that the taxpayers had been compelled to give
the government any valuable information. 08
102. Id. at 397-99.
103. Id. at 397. Analogizing the facts to those in Couch, the Court discerned
"no difference between the delivery to the attorneys . . . and delivery to the ac-
countant in the Couch case ... [because] ... the documents sought were obtainable
without personal compulsion on the accused." Id. at 398.
104. Id. at 397.
105. Id. at 409-10. The Court also analyzed whether the privilege would have
protected the documents if they had remained in the possession of the taxpayer
because of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 403-05. The Court acknowledged
that documents privileged in the hands of the taxpayer could not lose their privi-
leged status simply because they were transferred to the taxpayer's attorneys for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Id. at 404-05. Such reasoning, the Court
noted, would defeat a major purpose of the attorney-client privilege. Id.
106. Id. at 409-10.
107. Id. at 410. See also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957).
108. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
noted the majority's emphasis on the compelled production of documents that are
prepared voluntarily and stated that even if one's private papers were prepared
voluntarily, "it is the compelled production of testimonial evidence, not just the
compelled creation of such evidence, against which the privilege protects." Id. at




Finally, the Court conceded that a significant purpose of
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was the
protection of "personal privacy," but stated that the Fifth
Amendment should not "serve as a general protector of pri-
vacy."10 9 Noting that the Boyd Court prohibited the compulsory
production of private books and papers, the Fisher Court la-
belled the Boyd holding as "a rule searching for a rationale con-
sistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment against
compelling a person to give 'testimony' that incriminates
him."110 Thus, the Court shifted its analytical approach from
one that emphasized the protection of an individual's private
documents to one that focused on the communicative aspects of
producing any documents prepared voluntarily."' Apparently
acknowledging its analytical shift in reasoning, the Court cau-
tiously noted in a footnote that there could be "[sipecial
problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a
personal diary, [which were] not involved here."112 Moreover,
the Court expressly left open the question "[w]hether the Fifth
Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own
tax records in his possession."" 3 Thus, the Court did not over-
rule Boyd, but declined to address the issue of what specific type
of documents would receive the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment as established in Boyd and reaffirmed the line of pre-
Fisher Supreme Court decisions. 14
109. Id. at 399-401.
110. Id. at 409.
111. Id. at 406-09.
112. Id. at 401 n.7 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 414.
114. Id. Justice Brennan concurred in the holding, but emphasized the level
of involvement by the accountants and the business, rather than the private na-
ture of the documents. Id. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his concurring
opinion, Justice Brennan noted that the question left open by the majority implied
"that the privilege might not protect against compelled production of tax records
that are. . . 'private papers,'" and labelled this implication as "contrary to settled
constitutional jurisprudence." Id. at 415. Justice Brennan further noted that the
scope of the privilege was enunciated in Boyd and reiterated in a long line of
Supreme Court decisions that remained unquestioned until the majority opinion in
Fisher. Id. at 419-20.
Justice Brennan provided ample precedent for his contention that the protec-
tion of personal privacy was a fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Id. at 416-17. Referring to pre-colonial British
authorities, he argued that the privilege historically protected the production of
books and papers. Id. at 418.
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The new approach of the Fisher Court was evident later in
1976 when the Supreme Court decided Andresen v. Mary-
land.115 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
admission into evidence of a lawyer's business records seized
pursuant to a valid warrant violated the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.116
Andresen was a real estate attorney under investigation by
state authorities for fraud.117 The investigators procured a
search warrant and seized documents from Andresen's law of-
fice. 118 Several of these documents were admitted into evidence
at Andresen's criminal trial, some of which had been prepared
voluntarily by Andresen himself.119
Andresen relied on Boyd and Henkel and argued that the
seizure of his business records for the purpose of using them
against him at trial violated his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. 120 Relying upon Couch and Fisher, however,
the Supreme Court rejected Andresen's argument and found
that he "was not asked to say or to do anything."121 Nor was he
compelled to testify at the trial.122 He merely prepared the doc-
uments that were later authenticated at trial by a handwriting
expert.123 Therefore, the Court held that Andresen's personal
business records and subsequent introduction into evidence at
his trial did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege even
though the documents contained incriminating information. 124
As a practical matter, Justice Brennan argued that "[tihe ability to think pri-
vate thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to preserve
intimate memories would be curtailed through fear that those thoughts or the
events of those memories would become the subjects of criminal sanctions." Id. at
420.
115. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
116. Id. at 465. A second question presented was whether the search and
seizure of the attorney's business records from his office was "unreasonable" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. This Note will not address that issue.
117. Id. at 465-66.
118. Id. at 466-67.
119. Id. at 468.
120. Id. at 471-72.
121. Id. at 472-73.
122. Id. at 473.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 471-77. Justice Brennan dissented and contended that Andresen's
business records fell within the Fifth Amendment zone of privacy acknowledged in
Bellis. Id. at 484-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17
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The Court reaffirmed that the Fifth Amendment protected
persons from compelled acts that could be construed as incrimi-
nating, but that it would not protect one from the contents dis-
closed by the act of production.125 The Court also reiterated
that in some cases the privilege could apply because the mere
act of producing the papers might "constitute a compulsory au-
thentication of incriminating information."1 26
Finally, in United States v. Doe, 27 five grand jury subpoe-
nas were issued to a sole proprietor in an effort to obtain his
private business records. 28 Applying the reasoning of Fisher
that the constitutional right protected only compulsory self-in-
crimination, the Supreme Court held that the contents of the
records were not privileged because the records had been cre-
ated voluntarily and because the sole proprietor was not com-
pelled to affirm the truth of their contents. 29 However, the
government could not use the incriminating evidence resulting
from the act of producing the records. 30
In a one-paragraph concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
declared "that the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no pro-
tection for the contents of private papers of any kind."' 31 Addi-
tionally, Justice O'Connor stated that Fisher "sounded the
death knell for Boyd." 32
125. Id. at 473.
126. Id. at 473-74.
127. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
128. Id. at 606-07.
129. Id. at 610-12. The Court applied the Fisher rationale that the Fifth
Amendment protected only against compelled self-incrimination, even though the
Fisher Court declined to decide whether the privilege protected the contents of per-
sonal business records. Id. at 610-11.
The Court then analyzed whether the act of producing the documents required
Fifth Amendment protection. Id. at 612-13. Here the Court was bound by the
trial court's finding of fact, affirmed by the court of appeals, that the act of produc-
tion involved self-incriminating testimony. Id. at 613. Therefore, the Supreme
Court did not disturb this finding of fact. Id. at 613-14.
130. Id. at 615 n.14.
131. Id. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. Id. In a recent act of production case, Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990), a mother invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege
as a shield to defy a Maryland juvenile court order to produce her child. Id. at 551-
54. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, which cited Doe and held that "a
person may not claim the Amendment's protections based upon the incrimination
that may result from the contents or nature of the thing demanded." Id. at 555.
The Court reasoned that the privilege would not protect anything that could be
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Justice Marshall, in an opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part and joined by Justice Brennan, contended that
"[t]his case presented nothing remotely close to the question
that Justice O'Connor eagerly poses and answers." 133 Justice
Marshall also argued that purely private papers should receive
some Fifth Amendment protection.-M
E. The Present Conflict in the United States Courts of
Appeals
The Supreme Court's shift from a content-based standard
to a compelled production standard in its Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence has resulted in confusion and conflict in the federal
circuit courts of appeals. The following selected cases reflect
this conflict.
1. Cases Supporting the Boyd Content-Based Standard
The lead case supporting the Boyd approach to the Fifth
Amendment protection of private papers is In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Johanson).135 The case arose from a widespread
federal investigation (known as Abscam) into alleged govern-
mental corruption. 36 A federal grand jury subpoenaed certain
personal papers and records belonging to one of its targets,
otherwise revealed by an examination of the child. Id. The Court conceded that
the act of producing a child encompassed communicative assertions that could aid
the state in prosecuting the mother. Id. Despite the applicability of the privilege
to this act of production, however, the Court held that the mother could not assert
the privilege "because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and
because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime." Id. at
555-56. Analogizing the mother's status to that of a custodian of corporate records,
the Court held that "[w]hen a person assumes control over items that are the legit-
imate object of the government's noncriminal regulatory powers, the ability to in-
yoke the privilege is reduced." Id. at 558. The Court noted, however, that the
Fifth Amendment might limit the use of the testimonial aspects in the act of pro-
ducing the child at any subsequent criminal proceedings against the mother. Id.
at 561-62.
133. Doe, 465 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
134. Id. at 618-19 (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 1035-36.
19
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Louis Johanson, a Philadelphia City Councilman. 137 Johanson
had given the subpoenaed documents to his attorney. 138
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged
that Fisher directed an inquiry into whether the grand jury
could subpoena the documents directly from Johanson. 139 The
court held that "the fifth amendment protects an accused from
government-compelled disclosure of self-incriminating private
papers." 140 The court relied upon the Supreme Court's holding
in Bellis, reiterating that the privilege protected against the
compelled production of personal documents that are self-in-
criminating.' 4 ' The court noted that this principle was
strengthened "by virtue of the Fisher court's explicit efforts to
distinguish its facts from the facts in Boyd."142
The court then cited Griswold v. Connecticut'43 for the prop-
osition that the Fifth Amendment privilege allows persons to
maintain a "zone of privacy" into which the government may
not intrude. 144 The court acknowledged the importance to intel-
lectual development of placing one's thoughts in writing and
stated that "persons who value privacy may well refrain from
reducing thoughts to writing if their private papers can be used
against them in criminal proceedings." 145
The Third Circuit then alluded to the historical British and
colonial American abhorrence of "the compelled use of a man's
private papers as evidence used to convict him."14 The court
concluded "that failure to continue to preserve this right, which
we believe basic, would be a step backward in what has been a
long and bitterly contested battle to accord rights to persons
who stand accused of crime."147
137. Id. at 1036-37.
138. Id. at 1037.
139. Id. at 1042.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87).
142. Id. at 1043.
143. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that "the Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which govern-
ment may not force him to surrender to his detriment.").
144. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033, 1043 (3d Cir.
1980) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
145. Id.
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 1044.
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Several other circuits have expressly left open the possibil-
ity that the Fifth Amendment may protect certain private pa-
pers. l 48 These cases reflect the difficulty of applying the
confusing Fifth Amendment standards created by the Supreme
Court's shift in analysis in Fisher and Doe.
In Butcher v. Bailey, 149 a debtor was adjudicated bankrupt
in a proceeding brought under the federal bankruptcy laws. 150
The bankruptcy trustee demanded that the debtor surrender
"'all property of the estate and any recorded information, in-
cluding books, documents, records, and papers, relating to prop-
erty of the estate."'151 The debtor asserted a Fifth Amendment
privilege to resist producing certain documents.'1 2 The bank-
ruptcy court directed the debtor "to produce all nonpersonal
records relating to property of the estate."1 53 The bankruptcy
court also directed the debtor to produce "all personal records
relating to property of the estate, unless the contents of those
records would be incriminating or the act of producing the
records would be incriminating." 154 The trustee appealed from
that part of the court's order permitting the debtor to assert a
Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to personal records. 55
The Sixth Circuit analyzed whether the contents of the de-
manded records were privileged under the Fifth Amendment,
noting that "the protection afforded contents has been largely
eroded" by cases such as Fisher and Doe.156 The court expressly
refused to hold that "the contents of private papers are never
privileged," but indicated that contents could be protected "only
148. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir. 1991). Not-
ing the "Supreme Court's own reluctance to overrule Boyd," the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit indicated in 1991 that it would leave open the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment protected the contents of private papers in that
circuit. Id. at 1187 n.6. See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184
(11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
492 U.S. 907 (1989).
149. 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985).
150. Id. at 466.
151. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 521(3) (1983)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 467.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 468-69. Before analyzing the Fifth Amendment issue, the court
rejected the trustee's first contention that the Fifth Amendment privilege was not




in rare situations, where compelled disclosure would break 'the
heart of our sense of privacy.' "157 The court then determined
that papers relating to the property in the debtor's estate were
not the type of personal records that would "evoke serious con-
cern over privacy interests," and, therefore, reversed that part
of the lower court's order permitting Fifth Amendment protec-
tion of the documents' contents. 158
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reached a similar
conclusion with respect to the Fifth Amendment zone of privacy
analysis in In re Steinberg.159 In this case, Steinberg was in-
dicted on conspiracy charges arising out of a federal investiga-
tion of fund-raising activities in a 1984 presidential
campaign. 160 Prior to trial, the prosecution subpoenaed note-
books possessed by Steinberg that contained any information
relating to the investigation. 16 1 The district court directed
Steinberg to obey the subpoena, but granted him immunity
from any evidence derived "from the act of producing the
records."162 However, the court did not grant immunity to the
contents of the records. 163 Steinberg refused to produce the
notebooks and was held in contempt.1M
On his appeal of the contempt order to the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, Steinberg argued that the notebooks were
personal papers and, therefore, were protected by the Fifth
Amendment.165 The court acknowledged that the Boyd holding
had been eroded by the recent Supreme Court decisions in
Fisher, Andresen and Doe, but emphasized that the Supreme
Court had not determined whether the contents of personal pa-
157. Id. at 469 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619 n.2 (1984) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part)).
158. Id. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for fur-
ther fact-finding relating to act of production issues. Id. at 469-70.
159. 837 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1988).
160. Id. at 527.
161. Id. at 527-28.
162. Id. at 528. Since Steinberg was granted immunity, he did not need to
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. However, he
was not immune from incriminating evidence found in the contents of the docu-
ments. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 527.
165. Id. at 528.
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pers should receive Fifth Amendment protection.166 The court
also observed that these particular Supreme Court decisions
had generated divergent analytical approaches in the courts of
appeals. 167
Refusing to express an opinion on whether there should be
Fifth Amendment protection for the contents of personal pa-
pers, the court seemingly approved of the Sixth Circuit's analy-
sis in Butcher v. Bailey.168 Similar to the Sixth Circuit's
methodology in Butcher, the court then analyzed whether the
subpoenaed documents were truly personal, and concluded that
they were not.169 Therefore, the documents were not protected
by the Fifth Amendment.170
2. Cases That Reject the Boyd Content-Based Standard
The leading case among the courts of appeals that has re-
jected the Boyd standard is United States v. Wujkowski. 171 In
Wujkowski, the Department of Energy subpoenaed records from
officers of firms doing business with the department in connec-
tion with an ongoing investigation of corruption amongst the
department's employees and contractors. 172 The subpoena man-
dated that the officers produce "all original desk and pocket cal-
endars, appointment books, planner schedules, and daily
meeting logs maintained or kept on a personal and/or business
basis for [specific] calendar years."173 In addition to business
166. Id. at 528-29.
167. Id. at 528-30.
168. Id. at 530. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Doe limited the
Fifth Amendment protection of private papers and that "if the contents of private
papers are protected at all-a matter to which we express no opinion today-'it is
only in rare situations, where compelled disclosure would break "the heart of our
sense of privacy."'" Id. (quoting Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 925 (1985) (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619
n.2 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring in part))).
169. Id. at 530. Accord United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir.
1989) (acknowledging the erosion of the Boyd holding but implicitly approving of
the narrow Fifth Amendment privacy protection articulated in Butcher).
170. Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 530.
171. 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1991).
172. Id. at 982. One of the department's contractors, Technology and Man-
agement Services, Inc. (TMS) allegedly gave "gratuities to Department employees
in return for favorable treatment on contracts and mischarged the Department on
contracts." Id. The appellants in this case, Wujkowski and Stone, were the officers
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records, the subpoena required that one officer produce "records
related to a beach home he owned,"174 including "a list of names
and addresses of all people who had used the house" within a
given period of time and "any correspondence related to its
use."'1
7 5
The officers agreed to submit the business documents to the
district court for an in camera review but refused to produce
them to the department for inspection, asserting a Fifth
Amendment claim that the documents were privileged because
they were personal. 176 Rejecting this argument, the district
court ordered the officers to produce the records to the depart-
ment for inspection. 177 When one officer refused to produce the
documents relating to his beach house, the court held him in
contempt. 78
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the two approaches
used by the Supreme Court to decide whether the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege should apply to particular papers. 79 Citing Bel-
lis, the court noted that the initial analytical approach
emphasized "whether the contents of a subpoenaed item would
be self-incriminating." 80 The court then noted that the
Supreme Court in Fisher shifted its Fifth Amendment standard
174. Id. Specifically, "[tihe Department contended that Wujkowski had al-
lowed its employees to use the house in return for preferential treatment for his
business interests." Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Initially, the officers obeyed a court order to produce the calendars
and schedules for an "in camera review to determine whether the materials were
corporate or personal." Id. However, the department then contended that an in
camera review was unnecessary and requested the court to so rule. Id. Holding
that the contents of the documents were not protected by the Fifth Amendment,
the court determined that an in camera review of the papers was unnecessary and
ordered their production to the department. Id. at 983-84. It is this order that the
officers refused to obey, claiming a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion. Id.
177. Id. The district court held that neither the business records nor the cal-
endars' and schedules' contents were protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Id. at 983. The court further held that "the act of producing any personal notations
in these materials did not create any additional threat of self-incrimination beyond
the unprivileged act of producing the corporate notations." Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. On appeal, the department contended that neither the documents'
contents nor the act of producing them was protected by the Fifth Amendment
privilege. Id.
180. Id. (citing Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87).
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to "whether the act of production associated with relinquishing
an item would be self-incriminating."181
Relying upon holdings of the Eighth8 2 and First 8 3 Circuits,
the Fourth Circuit held that the officers could not invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege to shield the documents' contents
from scrutiny. 8 4 The court reasoned that the only compulsion
created by the department's demand was the act of producing
the documents. 8 5
III. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 186 the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated Doe in 1989
in connection with suspected violations of federal securities
laws.187 Because the investigation involved Doe's personal bro-
kerage accounts, the SEC issued a subpoena demanding the
production of certain documents, including Doe's personal
181. Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410).
182. Id. See United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that the admission of day-timers as private papers did not violate the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination). The Fourth Circuit's reliance on
Mason is curious since the Mason court suggested that certain private documents
could possibly receive Fifth Amendment protection. Mason, 869 F.2d at 416.
183. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d at 983. See In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527, 530 (1st
Cir. 1988) (holding that the contents of notebooks were not protected by the Fifth
Amendment privilege). The Fourth Circuit's reliance on Steinberg is also curious
since the First Circuit in Steinberg indicated approval of at least a modest content-
based protection. Id. at 530.
184. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d at 983. Accord In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege "does not cover the
contents of any voluntarily prepared records, including personal ones"); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that "the
Supreme Court has now made it clear that regardless of the precise characteriza-
tion of the [subject] papers, the contents of such documents are not privileged
under the Fifth Amendment in the absence of some showing that creation of the
documents was the product of compulsion").
185. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d at 983 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 n.11). Noting
that some of the subpoenaed documents were corporate records, the court stated
that any official records would not be protected by the personal privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. Because the determinative factor in the act of production
analysis was whether the documents were personal or corporate, the court re-
manded the case to the district court for further factfinding regarding the nature of
the documents. Id. at 984-86.
186. 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).
187. Id. at 88. Doe had previously testified before the SEC about the "trading
of securities in his personal brokerage accounts." Id. at 89.
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
"'[d]esk calendars, diaries and appointment books.'"1s Doe
complied with the subpoena and produced photocopies of docu-
ments along with a letter from his attorney indicating that the
material produced was "entitled to confidential treatment ...
and that access to them by any third party not a member of the
Commission or its Staff [would] be denied."89
During this civil investigation, the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York requested that the SEC turn
over the Doe documents for government inspection and the SEC
complied. 90 The U.S. Attorney suspected that the original cal-
endar had been altered before it was photocopied and given to
the SEC.191 Therefore, a grand jury issued a subpoena demand-
ing the production of Doe's original personal calendar. 92
Doe refused to surrender his calendar, arguing that the
subpoena should not be enforced because "the contents of the
calendar as well as the act of producing it were protected by the
Fifth Amendment."193 The district court agreed and held that
the calendar was an "intimate personal document" and that
both the original and altered calendar were protected by the
Fifth Amendment privilege. 94
A. The Second Circuit Majority Opinion
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Doe relied on Boyd, continuing his argument
that "the contents of the calendar [were] protected from com-
pelled production" under the self-incrimination clause of the
188. Id.
189. Id. The following information was stamped on every page of Doe's docu-
ments: "This document is provided to the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission solely for its use, and neither the document nor its contents may be
disclosed to any other person or entity, pursuant to a claim of confidentiality made
by letter dated JAN 28 1991." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. When the photocopied calendar was examined by the U.S. Attorney,
the government became suspicious that entries in the original version of the calen-
dar had been "whited-out" with "liquid paper" before it was copied and produced to
the SEC. Id. The government confirmed its suspicions when Doe's attorney al-
lowed the U.S. Attorney to look at the documents. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. Doe also contended that the government had breached the confidenti-
ality agreement between Doe and the SEC "by providing a copy of the calendar to
the U.S. Attorney's Office." Id.
194. Id. at 90.
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Fifth Amendment. 195 The court acknowledged the holding of
Boyd but interpreted its appearance in later cases as "dictum,"
thus indicating to the Second Circuit that certain aspects of the
majority decision in Boyd did not survive Fisher.196
The Second Circuit reasoned that the Fifth Amendment
could not act as a "general protector of privacy."197 The court
then stated that the Fifth Amendment would not protect
against disclosing private information but would protect
against compelling self-incrimination. 9  Following Boyd, Doe
argued that the Fifth Amendment protected the contents of the
voluntarily prepared non-business related calendar. 99
The first issue analyzed by the In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum court was whether the contents of the calendar
were protected by the Fifth Amendment.200 The court deter-
mined that they were not for three reasons. 20' First, the court
distinguished Boyd from In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum because the documents in Boyd were business related
while the calendar in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
was a non-business document.20 2 Second, the court reasoned
that Fisher and its progeny had undermined the Boyd holding
and, therefore, protection of privacy was provided for under the
Fourth Amendment rather than under the Fifth Amendment.20 3
That is, under In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, Andre-
sen and Fisher, the right to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination turned on whether the desired document was cre-
ated voluntarily and whether the act of producing it would con-
195. Id.
196. Id. at 90-91. The court relied on Fisher, which reasoned that the con-
tents of a document created voluntarily cannot be deemed compelled evidence
within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 91. The court then observed that
the Fisher Court concluded that summonses for documents created voluntarily
could be enforced "unless the act of producing the documents was itself subject to a
valid Fifth Amendment privilege." Id.
197. Id. at 93.
198. Id. at 91 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
199. Id. at 92.
200. Id. at 90-93.
201. Id. at 92-93.
202. Id. at 92.




stitute compulsory testimony.2 4 Third, the court was guided by
the opinions of three other courts of appeals, which held that
the Fifth Amendment did not protect the contents of voluntarily
created business or personal documents. 205
The second issue analyzed by the In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum court was whether producing the calendar
itself constituted self-incriminating testimony.2 6 The court
noted that since Doe had already given a copy of the calendar to
the SEC and testified to the Grand Jury about its whereabouts,
existence, and use, producing the actual calendar would dis-
close nothing more to the government than Doe himself had al-
ready disclosed to the SEC.207 Thus, producing the calendar
would neither "implicitly authenticate" the document nor dis-
close the location or existence of the subpoenaed calendar to the
government. 20 8 The court concluded that compliance with the
subpoena would only constitute "surrender" of the calendar
rather than testimonial evidence. 20 9 The court held, therefore,
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
did not apply to the act of producing Doe's calendar.210
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Altimari dissented and contended that the Supreme
Court had applied its Fifth Amendment holding in Boyd regard-
ing the protection of the contents of private papers in subse-
quent decisions.211 He noted that the Boyd holding as it relates
to protection of private papers has never been reversed,212 "nor
has a majority of the Court indicated that it would so rule in a
204. Id. However, the Second Circuit noted that Fisher did not address
whether the Fifth Amendment created a zone of privacy that would shield private
documents created voluntarily. Id. at 91.
205. Id. at 93 (citing Wujkowski, 929 F.2d at 983, 985; In re Sealed Case, 877
F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419
(9th Cir. 1985)).
206. Id. at 93-94.
207. Id. at 93.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 93-94.
211. Id. at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (citing Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 377 (1911); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); Couch v.
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case dealing with personal papers."213 Moreover, Judge Al-
timari criticized the majority for its failure to even mention the
Third Circuit decision, In re Grand Jury Proceedings,214 in
which the court held that the Fifth Amendment provides protec-
tion against compulsory disclosure of "self-incriminating pri-
vate papers, such as purely personal date books." 215 He then
noted the four other circuits21 6 that had suggested that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may still apply
to the contents of certain private documents.217 Thus, Judge Al-
timari concluded that the Second Circuit should follow the Boyd
holding until the Supreme Court itself overrules Boyd.218
IV. Analysis
Boyd and later Supreme Court cases indicated that the
Fifth Amendment protected the contents of private papers. 21 9
Although Boyd held specifically that the contents of private pa-
pers were protected,220 the Court in subsequent cases did not
directly address the issue of protection of purely private pa-
pers.221 Instead, the Court decided issues involving the protec-
tion of papers held by third persons222 and those of
partnerships22 3 and corporations.2 Therefore, one could argue
that the Court had been referring to the protection of private
papers merely in dicta.22 5
However, the better view is that the repetition of the Boyd
holding in later cases reflected an established standard of law.
213. Id.
214. 632 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir. 1980).
215. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 96 (Altimari, J., dis-
senting) (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3d Cir. 1980)).
216. See Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S.
925 (1985); In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Mason,
869 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 921 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir. 1991).
217. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 96.
218. Id.
219. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974).
220. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
221. See supra notes 80-114, 127-34 and accompanying text.
222. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
223. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
224. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).




Nowhere is this clearer than in Bellis when the Court, in 1974,
stated that "it has long been established, of course, that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion protects an individual from compelled production of his
personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral
testimony."226
This standard has been questioned because the Fisher
Court emphasized that the Fifth Amendment would only pro-
tect the contents of private papers if the act of producing them
involved self-incrimination.227 Fisher, decided only two years
after Bellis, involved a taxpayer's business papers that had
been transferred to his attorney.228 The Court held that the tax-
payer's self-incrimination privilege was "not violated by enforce-
ment of the summonses directed toward" his lawyer.229 The
Court reasoned that there was no more personal compulsion di-
rected at the taxpayer in Fisher than that which was directed
against the taxpayer in Couch where the subject papers were in
the hands of an accountant. 230
The taxpayer in Fisher argued that the Boyd holding pro-
hibited the production of his papers.231 The Court found, how-
ever, that preparation of the subject papers was "wholly
voluntary"23 2 and, therefore, could not be considered "compelled
testimonial evidence." 233 This reasoning has become the basis
of the claim that the Boyd holding did not survive Fisher.234
The problems with this claim are that 1) the Fisher Court did
not overrule Boyd, 2) the Fisher Court did not question the va-
lidity of the longstanding principle of law regarding Fifth
Amendment privacy protection, which had been repeated two
226. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87.
227. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408.
228. Id. at 394.
229. Id. at 397.
230. Id. at 397-98.
231. Id. at 395, 405.
232. Id. at 409.
233. Id. at 409-10.
234. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605,618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion contended that the Boyd holding had
been repeated as dicta, but that it did not survive Fisher. Id. See also In re Grand
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years earlier in Bellis,235 and 3) the Fisher Court expressly
stated that the protection of truly private papers was not at is-
sue in the case.23 6
The Second Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
TecuM23 7 overlooked these three problems and applied the rea-
soning of Fisher to purely private papers.23 8 The court reasoned
that the Fisher rationale undermined the continued validity of
Boyd.239 Additionally, it relied heavily on Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Doe.240 However, Justice O'Connor's con-
currence was a conclusory one-paragraph opinion that lacked
historical analysis.241 Although the Second Circuit conceded
that no other justice joined in her opinion, the court determined
that the Supreme Court majority in Bouknight242 indicated
agreement with her conclusion in Doe. 243 However, Bouknight
involved the production of a child24 and did not consider docu-
ments of any kind, private or otherwise. Therefore, Bouknight
should not have been relied upon to implicitly overrule the well
established Fifth Amendment protection of private papers.
The Second Circuit also relied upon decisions of other cir-
cuit courts to determine that the Fifth Amendment does not
protect the contents of subpoenaed documents.4 5 The Second
Circuit's reliance on these cases is appropriate because the
Fourth, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits considered and
rejected the view that the Boyd content-based standard is still
good law.24
235. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87; see supra text accompanying note 226.
236. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 n.7.
237. 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).
238. Id. at 91.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 92.
241. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
242. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
243. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 92.
244. Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 551 (1990).
245. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 93 (citing In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983, 985 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83,
84 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
246. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d at 983; In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 759 F.2d at




However, the Second Circuit's analysis is seriously flawed
because the court ignored important and recent decisions in
other circuits. The court's holding in In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum directly conflicts with In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings,247 in which the Third Circuit held that the Fifth
Amendment prohibited the compelled production of private pa-
pers.248 The Third Circuit convincingly detailed the Supreme
Court's repeated reaffirmation of the Boyd content-based stan-
dard.249 The court also explained how the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination helped to create a "zone of
privacy" into which the government may not intrude. 250 Echo-
ing Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fisher,251 the Third
Circuit reasoned:
Committing one's thoughts to paper frequently stimulates the de-
velopment of an idea. Yet, persons who value privacy may well
refrain from reducing thoughts to writing if their private papers
can be used against them in criminal proceedings. This would
erode the writing, thinking, speech tradition basic to our
society.252
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit ignored this powerful argument.
Finally, the Third Circuit based its holding upon its view of
the Framers' intent of the American Constitution and the his-
247. 632 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir. 1980).
248. Id. at 1044.
249. Id. at 1042-43.
250. Id. at 1043.
251. 425 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan eloquently
argued:
Many of the matters within an individual's knowledge may as easily be re-
tained within his head as set down on a scrap of paper. I perceive no princi-
ple which does not permit compelling one to disclose the contents of one's
mind but does permit compelling the disclosure of the contents of that scrap
of paper by compelling its production. Under a contrary view, the constitu-
tional protection would turn on fortuity, and persons would, at their peril,
record their thoughts and the events of their lives. The ability to think pri-
vate thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to pre-
serve intimate memories would be curtailed through fear that those
thoughts or the events of those memories would become the subjects of crim-
inal sanctions however invalidly imposed.
Id. at 420.
252. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d at 1043.
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torical setting in which they drafted the Fifth Amendment.253
The court quoted a mid-18th century English decision prohibit-
ing a search for private papers as wrongfully "compelling self
accusation."254 The Third Circuit further noted that the English
court observed that "papers are often the dearest property a
man can have."255
In addition, the Second Circuit in In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum ignored the interesting compromise posi-
tion advanced by the First,256 Sixth 257 and Eighth Circuits, 258
which rejected the broad Boyd content-based standard and sug-
gested a limited Fifth Amendment protection for the contents of
private papers. The Sixth Circuit initially articulated this lim-
ited protection by indicating that contents could be protected
"only in rare situations, where compelled disclosure would
break 'the heart of our sense of privacy.' "259
Furthermore, Judge Altimari's dissent in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum noted correctly that Boyd has never
been overruled. 26° Judge Altimari distinguished the production
253. Id. at 1043-44.
254. Id. at 1043 n.19 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029, 1038, 1041, 1063 (KB. 1765)).
255. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d at 1044 (citing 0. J. ROGGE, THE
FIRST AND THE FirtH 178 (1949) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807,
817-18 (1765))).
The Third Circuit also observed that the constitution of Virginia in 1776 con-
tained a self-incrimination clause, even though an accused was not permitted to
testify in his own defense at that time. Id. The court then reasoned that the con-
stitutional guarantee "would have been meaningless" if "an accused could.., be
forced to give his private writings to be used as evidence against him in a criminal
trial." Id.
256. In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527, 529-30 (1st Cir. 1988).
257. Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S.
925 (1985).
258. United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 907 (1989).
259. Butcher, 753 F.2d at 469 (quoting United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618
n.2 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part)). Accord Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 530;
Mason, 869 F.2d at 416.
260. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 95. Judge Altimari
also observed that two Supreme Court Justices, Marshall and Brennan, responded
jointly to Justice O'Connor's concurrence in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605,
618-19 (1984), with their beliefs that the Fifth Amendment continued to protect
some private papers. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 95.
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of a child in Bouknight from the production of documents con-
taining "one's innermost thoughts. 261
The Supreme Court considered but denied a petition for
certiorari filed by appellee Doe in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum. 262 Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the
proper outcome should have been a reaffirmation of the Boyd
Fifth Amendment content-based standard and of the values
enunciated in In re Grand Jury Proceedings.263 Such an out-
come would assure the vitality of the Framers' original intent
regarding the Fifth Amendment's protection of privacy. An ac-
ceptable alternative would be the limited protection accorded
the contents of private papers as suggested by the First, Sixth
and Eighth Circuits. 264
Given the confusion amongst the circuits regarding the
Fifth Amendment's protection of private papers, it is likely that
a case similar to In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum will
soon again be before the Supreme Court. Eventually, the
Supreme Court will be forced to resolve the disharmony
amongst the circuits. At that point, if the rationale and holding
of the Second Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum becomes the law of the land, the Supreme Court will have
issued an astonishing re-interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Self-Incrimination Clause would no longer have any
role in the protection of American privacy.265
261. Id. at 95-96.
262. 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).
263. 632 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir. 1980).
264. In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d at 530; Butcher, 753 F.2d at 469; Mason, 869
F.2d at 416.
265. In 1976, Justice Brennan observed that "[e]xpressions are legion in opin-
ions of [the Supreme] Court that the protection of personal privacy is a central
purpose of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination." Fisher, 425 U.S. at
416 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan further demonstrated that
"[w]ithout a doubt, the common-law privilege against self-incrimination in Eng-
land extended to protection against the production of incriminating personal pa-
pers prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution." Id. at 418 n.4.
The threat to the historical foundation of the Self-Incrimination Clause is best
and most simply expressed by Leonard Levy in his description of the refusal of an
English court in 1744 to honor the prosecution's request that a defendant be re-
quired to turn over his business records: "Lord Mansfield summed up the law by
declaring that the defendant, in a criminal case, could not be compelled to produce
any incriminating documentary evidence 'though he should hold it in his hands in
Court.'" LEVY, supra note 10, at 330.
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V. Conclusion
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was first taken away from corporations, then from partner-
ships, and later from persons who had transferred their per-
sonal documents to a third party. In the Second Circuit,
because of In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Fifth
Amendment no longer protects one's personal papers, calen-
dars, diaries or other private documents, which may contain
thoughts that were never intended to be published. Thus, a
prosecutor in the Second Circuit can now expose one's inner-
most written thoughts to the public.
The Supreme Court has undeniably shifted its position on
whether the Fifth Amendment protects private papers without
adequately explaining why its shifts were necessary or how its
position has remained consonant with the original intent of the
Framers of the Fifth Amendment. Until the Supreme Court de-
cides the scope of Fifth Amendment protection to be accorded to
private papers, however, the federal circuit courts of appeals
will continue to apply their own interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. Thus, it is possible that in one part of our nation, a private
diary containing one's innermost thoughts will be protected
from public scrutiny while in another part of this country, those
same thoughts will be open to public scrutiny.
Since the Supreme Court has chosen, once again, not to de-
cide this constitutional issue, the fate of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination regarding the contents of one's per-
sonal papers remains unclear. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit's
decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum has cre-
ated more disharmony amongst the circuits regarding this is-
sue, and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari to In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum has only thwarted its resolve.
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